On 13 March 2026, a town wires $545,598 to its contractor. The money goes elsewhere. Its own systems had not been touched: a domain registered four days earlier carried one extra letter.
Emails ask that the project's fourth payment, owed to Wildcat Contractors (the company burying lines along Ocean Boulevard), switch from a cheque to a wire transfer. The domain used, surfsidesbeach.org, had been registered on 9 March, four days earlier: one extra "s" over the town's own surfsidebeach.org. Before paying, the town writes to the contractor's real domain asking for a phone callback. The reply contains a number, and the review will not be able to establish whether it came from a Wildcat employee or from the fraudsters. The transfer goes out the same day. The matter is discovered on 28 April, 46 days later, and the money had landed in a Utah bank account.
Independent review commissioned by the town, published July 2026, reported by WBTW. The digital forensic investigation found no unauthorized access to the town's internal systems or Microsoft 365 accounts. It covered the town only: the state of the contractor's email was not examined.
All of them pair a hiring-related word with the brand name: applicationloreal.com, processhiringloreal.com, lorealhiringnetwork.com. Two registrars, 52 listed registrants, but likely just one or two people behind the whole set. None of the 705 domains resolved to a website at the time the complaint was filed. They were held in reserve, ready to use. The brand obtained their transfer through a dispute resolution proceeding.
UDRP decision issued under WIPO, reported by Domain Name Wire on 18 March 2026.
Reviewing more than 600 domains tied to a single group between the first quarter of 2022 and that of 2025, researchers found that 81% impersonate technology vendors rather than the target's public brand. The recurring words in the addresses are vpn, helpdesk, okta, sso, mfa, servicedesk. The detail that matters next: these domains stay active for less than seven days on average.
ReliaQuest, analysis published 5 June 2025. Dataset of more than 600 domains, first quarter 2022 to first quarter 2025.
Three years before the Surfside Beach wire transfer, the Government of Canada had described the technique in two sentences, on its public awareness website.
"Typosquatting is a type of cybersquatting that resembles an already established URL company domain but with an added and intentional typo."
"Entering any information or clicking on links on this website can expose your data to the cyber criminals hosting this typosquatting scam."
The important word is not "hack". It is "resembles".
The Surfside Beach emails came from a domain owned by the fraudster, ordinarily registered, paid for with a few dollars. The independent review found no intrusion into the town's systems. Which side had an email account compromised, nobody has established: the review covered the town, not its contractor. What is certain is that the name used to deceive was stolen from no one.
And the victim is almost never who you'd expect. Surfside Beach's fake domain was used to deceive a supplier. The L'OrΓ©al domains targeted job applicants. The third case targeted employees themselves, by imitating the VPN portal or the help desk. Your domain is an asset you only half control: the exact name is yours, everything that resembles it belongs to whoever registers it first.
The number that sums up the whole problem isn't $545,598. It's 46. For those 46 days, the town thought it had paid its contractor, and the contractor was waiting to be paid. The town had in fact checked what it had been taught to check: it asked for a phone callback. Nobody was watching the one thing that would have exposed the fraud in a minute: an almost identical domain, registered four days before the transfer.
This isn't a hunch. The two figures below explain why an annual check can't work.
The analysis covered more than 500 of the most visited sites in the world, between February and July 2024. Professional services, the category that holds accounting, law and consulting, accounted for more than a quarter of the impersonated brands, just behind internet services.
Zscaler ThreatLabz, Phishing via Typosquatting and Brand Impersonation: Trends and Tactics, published 10 September 2024.
Surfside Beach's domain was registered on 9 March and used on the 13th. In the 600-domain analysis, the useful lifespan runs about the same: less than seven days of activity on average before abandonment. A check run once a year has roughly a one-in-fifty chance of landing inside that window. The rest of the time, it finds nothing and reassures.
Surfside Beach dates: independent review commissioned by the town, July 2026. Domain lifespan: ReliaQuest, 5 June 2025.
This isn't negligence, it's a question of pace. An SMB has an IT provider paid to keep things running, not to query the domain name registry every morning. Nobody has a reason to type their own name with a typo.
And most of it never gets reported. Canadians reported more than $704 million in fraud losses in 2025, and more than $2.4 billion since 2022. The release announcing those figures notes that an estimated 5% to 10% of cases are reported. This isn't a measure of typosquatting specifically: it's the order of magnitude of what plays out silently in the same family of deception.
Missing, doubled or swapped letters, and neighbouring extensions, generated from your domain name alone.
Which of these variants are registered and actually serving a page today.
An image comparison against your real homepage, to separate a parked domain from one that impersonates you to deceive.
Who can write in your domain's name, and which services actually send on its behalf.
An entry opened in your portal the moment a confirmed variant appears, closed again when it disappears.
A dated document for leadership, a client auditing you, or your insurance broker.
The analysis is entirely external: no software on your servers, no access to your systems, no interruption. It starts from a domain name and looks at what resembles it, exactly the way someone drafting a fraudulent email in your name would.
What this is not, and it needs saying: it is not a domain takedown service, brand protection, or a legal filing service. We do not talk to registrars and we do not file complaints on your behalf. We tell you what exists, what actually imitates you, and when that changes. You cannot watch what you never bothered to name.
They require no technical knowledge. They are put to your IT lead, to your service provider, or to both in the same meeting.
These few lines paste as-is into a terminal: PowerShell on Windows, Bash on macOS and Linux. They generate the most common typos on your own domain name, then ask the DNS which ones answer. Nothing is installed, nothing is sent anywhere, and none of the sites found are visited.
# Replace cyberazimut.com with your own full domain name. domain=cyberazimut.com name=${domain%%.*} exts=$(printf '%s\n' "${domain#*.}" com ca net org | sort -u) awk -v s=$name 'BEGIN{ n = length(s); print s for (i=1;i<=n;i++) print substr(s,1,i-1) substr(s,i+1) # one letter short for (i=1;i<=n;i++) print substr(s,1,i) substr(s,i,1) substr(s,i+1) # doubled letter for (i=1;i<n;i++) print substr(s,1,i-1) substr(s,i+1,1) substr(s,i,1) substr(s,i+2) }' | sort -u | while read v; do for ext in $exts; do ip=$(dig +short +time=2 +tries=1 "$v.$ext" A | grep -m1 '^[0-9]') [ -n "$ip" ] && echo "$v.$ext -> $ip" done done echo "Done. A domain that responds isn't necessarily hostile."
# Replace cyberazimut.com with your own full domain name. $ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue' $domain = "cyberazimut.com" $name = $domain.Substring(0, $domain.IndexOf('.')) $exts = @($domain.Substring($domain.IndexOf('.') + 1), 'com', 'ca', 'net', 'org') | Select-Object -Unique $variants = [System.Collections.Generic.HashSet[string]]::new() $variants.Add($name) | Out-Null for ($i = 0; $i -lt $name.Length; $i++) { $variants.Add($name.Remove($i,1)) | Out-Null # one letter short $variants.Add($name.Insert($i+1, $name[$i])) | Out-Null # doubled letter } for ($i = 0; $i -lt $name.Length - 1; $i++) { $chars = $name.ToCharArray() $tmp = $chars[$i]; $chars[$i] = $chars[$i+1]; $chars[$i+1] = $tmp $variants.Add(-join $chars) | Out-Null # swapped letters } foreach ($v in ($variants | Sort-Object)) { foreach ($ext in $exts) { try { $task = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddressesAsync("$v.$ext") if ($task.Wait(1500) -and $task.Status -eq 'RanToCompletion') { $ip = $task.Result | Where-Object AddressFamily -eq 'InterNetwork' | Select-Object -First 1 if ($ip) { Write-Output "$v.$ext -> $ip" } } } catch {} } } Write-Output "Done. A domain that responds isn't necessarily hostile."
The first domain you recognise in the list should be your own: that's the sign everything works. The rest are domains that exist, that respond, and that you never registered.
What this result does not prove: that they are hostile. Many are parked by resellers, some belong to legitimate businesses, and a few are yours without anyone remembering it. The sorting starts there, and that is exactly what the visual comparison automates. The script also does not cover look-alike characters, such as a capital "I" standing in for a lowercase "l", nor extensions other than .com, .ca, .net and .org. It's a survey, not an inventory.
Three ways to start, without talking to anyone.
Does your domain have a twin? A free check of domains that look like yours: registration, DNS, ability to send email in your name. No account, no card.